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Abstract
This paper explores the use of strategic communication for nation building purposes in
Catalonia after the approval of the Second Statute of Autonomy in 1979. During this
period, the Generalitat de Catalunya, Catalonia’s self-government political organization,
has used the high degree of autonomy in a number of areas involving culture,
communications or education, among others, to enhance a Catalan identity opposed to the
Spanish identity. Soft power approaches – mainly the promotion of Catalan language,
culture, sports and symbols – and the implementation of linguistic laws have resulted in a
positive climate of opinion concerning an inclusive Catalan identity in a region where a high
percentage of the population has roots in other parts of Spain. After all these years, the
outcome has been positive for Catalan nationalism: Identification with Spain has decreased
while dual Catalan-Spanish and Catalan-only identification has grown; almost half of the
Catalan population is pro-independence while 40 years ago was less than 20 percent.
Nonetheless, the language variable still seems to be contention wall despite
communication management efforts. There is still a large majority of Catalans, mostly from
the Spanish-language community, that are opposed to the nation building, nowadays proindependence, process.
Key words: Strategic communication, public relations, propaganda, Spain, Catalonia
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Resumen
Este artículo explora el uso de la comunicación estratégica en el proceso de construcción
nacional catalana después de la aprobación del Segundo Estatuto de Autonomía en
1979. Durante este periodo, la Generalitat de Catalunya, la organización política que
gestiona el autogobierno de Cataluña, ha utilizado numerosas áreas de gobierno, como
la cultura, la educación o la comunicación, para promover una identidad catalana
opuesta a la identidad española. El uso de estrategias de poder blando – principalmente
la promoción del catalán como lengua vehicular en la esfera pública, la cultura, el
deporte o los símbolos – y la implementación de leyes lingüísticas han generado un clima
de opinión positivo en lo que respecta a la creación de una identidad catalana inclusiva
en una región en la que un alto porcentaje de la población tiene sus raíces en otras
partes de España. El balance ha sido positivo para el nacionalismo catalán: La sola
identificación con España ha decrecido mientras que la identificación dual CataluñaEspaña o solo Cataluña se ha incrementado; casi la mitad de la población catalana quiere
la independencia mientras que 40 años atrás era menos del 20 por ciento. Sin embargo,
la variable lingüística sigue actuando como muro de contención del nacionalismo a pesar
del uso de la comunicación estratégica. Una mayoría de catalanes, cuya lengua nativa es
el español, se opone al proceso de construcción nacional.
Palabras clave: Comunicación estratégica, relaciones públicas, propaganda, construcción
nacional, comunidades imaginadas, España, Cataluña
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1. INTRODUCCION
In the last three decades, successive Catalan governments, equipped with a high degree of
autonomy, have made intensive use of strategic communication to enhance a Catalan
identity with the objective of facilitating political change. However, the communicative
nature of the Catalan nation-building process has generally received little attention in the
academic literature (García, 2013).
There are a number of articles that have focused on the role of sports in the projection of
Catalan identity (Xifra, 2009a, 2009b; García, 2012a), the use of street protests in the
independence process (García, 2016), and the impact on public opinion of the
implementation of Catalan-only linguistic policies (Martínez-Herrera, 2002).
There are no holistic, descriptive analyses of how the use of strategic communication by
the Catalan government has affected the national sentiment of Catalans. This paper argues
that the use of strategic communication by the Catalan government has been successful in
fostering a stronger Catalan identity in contemporary Spain. Yet the enhancement of
Catalan identity has not translated into a pro-independence sentiment or political change
because, as opinion surveys demonstrate, it excludes large segments of the population,
namely those for whom Spanish is a first (though not necessarily only) language.
Several factors differentiate the case of Catalonia and the nation-building processes of new
emerging democracies. First, Catalonia is not a state and therefore lacks national unity.
Second, the strategic communication efforts of the regional government must compete
with the communication apparatus of the nation state which strives to maintain and
sometimes portray a different collective national identity (Morris, 2008).
A third factor is that in most of these “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991) there is a
non-nationalist side that is as strong as the nationalist (Fusi, 2006). This reality forces
regional governments to use persistently one-way strategic communication efforts,
emphasizing the identification features of that community in opposition to the legal
ISSN: 2174-3681
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nation, as happens in the Catalan case with Spain. The lack of legitimacy nation-building
political forces give to any public opposed to their objectives generally does not allow twoway communication models in which dissident voices have a presence in the public square.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Holtzhausen and Zerfass (2013) recently defined strategic communication as “the practice
of deliberate and purposive communication that a communication agent enacts in the
public sphere on behalf of a communicative entity to reach set goals” (p. 74). These
communicative entities have a multidisciplinary vision of communication and tend to
integrate public relations, public diplomacy and other communication functions into their
strategic communication efforts (van Dyke & Verčič, 2009).
The modern practice of public relations is described broadly as the strategic management
of communication and relationships between organizations and publics (Sriramesh &
Verčič, 2009). Scholars include public diplomacy as a specific part of the public relations
concept with numerous synergies across the field of strategic communication (Signitzer &
Wamser, 2006).
Taylor and Kent (2006) have emphasized the importance of strategic communication
efforts to enhance national identity, and nurture nation-building. Benier (1999) and
Kymlicka (2001) acknowledge that persuasive communication models by state-controlled
broadcast media have represented the primary tools in most nation-building programs. In
the case of nation-building processes for new democracies and developing countries, Van
Leuven (1996) and Taylor and Kent (2006) argue there is a first nation-building phase
where the relationship between government, media, and citizens is one-way. With
economic growth, the government incorporates other public voices, which is when dialogic
public relations can become reality.
Nevertheless, this perspective only explains nation-building processes for new democracies
and developing countries (Taylor, 2000a, 2000b). It does not take into account the
situation of regions like Catalonia, ruled by local politicians trying to build political nations
132
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within the framework of a hosting nation-state. The fact that the Spanish government also
has its own communication apparatus and that a significant portion of the population
shares a Catalan-Spanish identity makes Catalan nationalist politicians less open to
encouraging dissident voices in the public sphere.
The Catalan case combines traditional mass media propaganda, and the use of sports,
tourism, gastronomy, and cultural events for public diplomacy purposes. Indeed, there are
a number of examples in the literature on public diplomacy efforts, particularly based in
the use of sports, to project Catalonia internationally (Xifra, 2009a, 2009b). L’Etang (2006)
has noted the role of sports and tourism in building a national identity. Likewise, these
methods also reinforce the national identity internally around a collective sentiment of
achievement and pride.
2.1 Soft power and nation building
The Catalan case constitutes a good example of how to apply soft power to nation building.
The political concept of soft power can be explained as the way a country – or, by the same
token, a region – “may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other
countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and
openness – want to follow it” (Nye, 2004, p. 5).
Thanks to the soft power approach, the new institutions of the Catalan regional
government have succeeded in making the idea of being Catalan an attractive one among a
majority of Catalans. The intensive use of public media, an example of soft power (Nye,
2004), is partly responsible for this success.
There has not been, however, an absence of hard power methods in the Catalan case.
Indeed, the implementation of laws to foster the use of Catalan in education has
constituted an axis of regional politics. Research reveals that relative exposure to Catalan
versus Spanish marks the most explanatory variable in accounting for informant-toinformant deviation in measures of political ideology (p <.0000, R2 =.79, F = 69.17) (Vann,
ISSN: 2174-3681

133

REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE RELACIONES PÚBLICAS, Nº 15, VOL. VIII [Páginas 129-152]

2018

1999).
3. METHOD
This paper uses Catalonia as a case study of how the governments of regions or “stateless
nations” work to become nations for their own citizens. The author uses a qualitative
historical-critical method to investigate the connection between the strategic
communication management of a regional government in a nation-building process and
the attitudes of the population over the course of four decades. The approach is holistic
and considers each communication function, including those theoretically intended for
foreign publics such as public diplomacy. These data has been collected using press sources
(mainly the two main Spain’s newspaper, El País and El Mundo and the main regional
Catalan newspaper, La Vanguardia) as well as official statistics, history and political science
scholarship. This method has been applied in recent times to analyse the nation building
strategic communication efforts of other regions such as the Basque Country (García,
2012b).
The article evaluates the correlation between these strategic communication efforts and
the attitudinal changes of the Catalan population toward two of the paramount elements
that define any nation-building process: identity, and the political status quo (Keating,
2001). Additionally, the paper traces the correlation between those two factors and
forming part of the Spanish or Catalan linguistic community in order to establish some of
the most common barriers to the use of strategic communication in nation-building
processes. The author has made use of the two leading sociological statistical surveys
implemented in Catalonia – that of the CIS (Center for Sociological Research), Spain’s
government-backed national public opinion institute, and the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió
(Center of Opinion Studies), an organ of the Catalan autonomous government dedicated to
implementing polls and surveys analyzing the political and social evolution of Catalan
society. This historical-critical method can provide a valid interpretation optimal for
reproduction in the cases of other regions with a high degree of autonomy that have spent
long periods in a nation-building process.
134
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The data analysis does, however, have its limitations. It does not establish an empirical
alignment between strategic communication efforts and changes in perceptions, although
it can signal trends.
4. ANALYSIS
4.1. Public media campaigns
The Catalan government has used its extensive public media system to build narratives and
manufacture stories that suggest Catalonia is a de facto nation. Key factors include
programming attractive television and radio programs, controlling the local printed press
via indirect subsidies, and pushing intensive mass media campaigns.
The communicative power of the Catalan government is relevant. It is not only the owner
of the main media conglomerate that operates in Catalonia, Corporació Catalana de
Mitjans Audiovisuals (CCMA) [Catalan Corporation of Audiovisual Media]), a public
broadcast service in Catalan with six television channels, four radio stations including the
audience leader Catalunya Radio, and the Agencie Catalana de Noticies (Catalan News
Agency), among other companies. Its 2,285 employees (e-notícies, 2016) are equivalent to
roughly 40 percent of the entire 4,517-employee radio and television workforce in
Catalonia (Clúster Audiovisual de Catalunya, 2016).
The regional government’s media power also enables it to concede subsidies to the
regional newspapers published in Catalan (Blasco, 2008). Since 2008 the Catalan
Government gave subsidies worth 14 million euros per year to Catalan newspapers. One
newspaper published exclusively in Catalan, El Punt-Avui, is even co-owned by the regional
government (Rubio, 2014).
The added audience of the conglomerate of public channels represents approximately 16.6
percent of the total audience (Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya, 2016). This data
acquires more relevance if we take into consideration that the flagship of this group, TV3,
has the highest share (12 percent) in the region and their newscasts have the highest share
ISSN: 2174-3681
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(31 percent), more than twice the market share of Spain’s main national public channel
(Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya, 2016).
Two Catalan radio stations lead the radio broadcast system audience rankings, RAC 1 and
Catalunya Ràdio. Together they account for an audience of 1.3 million listeners, equivalent
to two-thirds of the entire audience in Catalonia. The public station Catalunya Ràdio is
directly promoted by the Catalan government while RAC 1, although private, receives
150,000 euros in annual subsidies as part of the government’s mission to promote the
Catalan language (Roger, 2013). In terms of opinion creation, radio in Spain is more
relevant than in other countries because it is a much more opinionated media platform
than television and dedicates considerably more space to political information.
Since 1979, two main features of the Catalan press landscape have been clear: its strong
dependence on public funds and its high level of politicization (González, 1995). In 2016,
within a context of budget cuts, the Catalan government gave 7.5 million euros to the
Catalan press via subsidies (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2016a). Furthermore, the Catalan
government, spent in 2015 more than 29 million euros to buy space in Catalan media to
publicize a number of institutional campaigns (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2016b).
In sum, thanks to the climate of opinion created by the Catalan public media apparatus,
even the most moderate part of the Catalan electorate, many not born in Catalonia, has
adopted the Catalan nationalist thesis about the need for more self-government for
Catalonia (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2016). The media strategy has proved effective.
4.2 Display of nation state-like institutional power
Since 1979, the Catalan government has pursued a localized replication of the powers and
symbols of Spain’s government. Catalonia has its own police force, sends government
representatives to visit foreign countries, and possesses ornamental signs such as a flag, a
national anthem, and so on (Moreno, 2001).
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Catalan institutions have proved not only an effective way to visualize Catalan identity but
also a way to occupy the public sphere. Indeed, most cultural life in Catalonia depends on
support from the Catalan government (McRoberts, 2001). The main Catalan civic, sport and
cultural organizations coordinate events, develop surveys and publish documents that all
promote Catalan culture. Their actions have persuaded many Catalans that not only does
the regional government support the “nation-building” process but Catalan society as a
whole.
A representation of this is the Catalan government’s creation of a slew of literary awards to
incentivize the creation of cultural products in the Catalan language. Indeed, there are
more than 1,000 literary prizes in Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). The most
important cultural entity in the region is Òmnium Cultural, a private organization that
receives 1.4 million euros annually from the Catalan government (La Vanguardia, 2012).
The Catalan government has also tried to capitalize on the international reputation of
leading Catalan artists to project the image of Catalonia and Barcelona as a creative city.
The celebration of special events such as the "Gaudí year" in 2002 and "The Dalí year" in
2004 has had considerable international resonance.
The prioritization of culture in Catalan, however, does bring some problems and
contradictions. One such example was when the Catalan Department of Culture promoted
a presentation of Catalan-only authors at the German Book Fair in 2009, questionably
excluding some of the most prominent Catalan authors whose work happens to be
produced in Spanish (El País, 2007).
4.3 Street protests
The organization of street protests to commemorate the Diada, the national day of
Catalonia on September 11, has played a huge role in the development of the Catalan proindependence movement. Although this annual event is usually organized by civic
associations like Òmnium Cultural, it has also counted on ample support from the Catalan
government in logistics, media support and finances. Massive, organized street protests,
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particularly the 2012, 2013 and 2014 Diada demonstrations, were successfully used as a
strategic communication tool to establish the independence of Catalonia on the political
agenda of Catalan citizens and politicians as well as the rest of the world (García, 2016).
4.4 Public diplomacy
Other soft power elements used to project Catalan identity around the world are sports,
cultural events and the display of a network of delegations, offices and cultural centers
around the world.
4.4.1. Barcelona Football Club (BFC)
BFC is the leading agenda-setter in the region (Xifra, 2009b). Indeed, 21.8 percent of all
media coverage in Catalonia has to do with BFC, more than the Catalan government’s 8.4
percent (Bañeres, 2000).
The exclusive use of Catalan flags during national and international matches, and the use of
giant banners with slogans such as “Catalonia is not Spain,” (Ara, 2013) not only energize
supporters but also communicate to the rest of the world the existence of an identity
conflict with Spain. BFC is constantly used as a national symbol. In 2010, BFC board
members agreed to offer the club’s facilities for use to help coordinate a referendum for
Catalan independence from Spain (La Vanguardia, 2010).
The identification between Catalonia and BFC is intentional. The Catalan government
launched a 2017 campaign with the slogan “If you feel FC Barcelona, you feel Catalonia” to
attract foreign tourism.
4.4.2. Organization of international sporting events
The organization of international events has always been seen as an opportunity for
Catalan nationalists to project Catalan identity as well as to inform the rest of the world
about the existence of a conflict between Catalonia and Spain. During the opening
ceremony of the Barcelona Olympics in 1992, some organized groups carried senyeres
(Catalan flags) and displayed slogans on t-shirts and banners such as “freedom for
138
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Catalonia” and “Catalonia is not Spain” in the same way they still do during BFC matches
(Hargreaves, 2000).
The Catalan government has taken pains to promote Catalan sports, in official
competitions usually reserved for nation states, through recognition of Catalan federations
of sports such as korfball, pitch and putt, futsal, rugby and Australian football.
4.4.3. Promotion of Catalan “national” teams
In the search for an international sports presence, the regional government has also
supported non-governmental actors such as the Pro-Catalan National Teams Platform
(Plataforma Pro Seleccions Esportives Catalanes) to promote campaigns such as “one
nation, one team,” encouraging Catalans to publicly demonstrate their support for national
teams (Roger, 2010).
4.4.4. Paradiplomacy efforts
With the intention of giving Catalonia a political and cultural presence in other countries,
between 2011 and 2014 the Generalitat de Catalunya had 25 embassies, commercial and
tourist offices, and institutes, such as the Ramon Llull institute for the promotion of
Catalan culture, in foreign countries (Hernández, 2016). The embassies, located in global
cities such as Paris, London, Brussels, Washington and New York, cannot be considered
embassies proper because only legal states can have ambassadors. However, these
delegations, as they are also known, do assume the same functions of political
representation.
4.5 Implementation of linguistic policies: Soft power or hard power?
The implementation of laws, such as the Catalan linguistic policies, intended to alter social
reality can be considered a use of hard power. There is some evidence that fostering
vernacular languages has contributed to a sense of disaffection among political
communities across Spain (Martínez-Herrera, 2002). The Catalan parliament's approvals of
the Law of Linguistic Normalization in 1983 and the Law of Linguistic Policy in 1998 were
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controversial. Their objectives were to promote the use of Catalan in the public sphere.
Although the Statute of Autonomy considers Castilian Spanish and Catalan both languages
of Catalonia, the two aforementioned laws prioritized the use of Catalan (McRoberts,
2001).
Nevertheless, considering that Spanish is the native language of a majority of Catalans
(Idescat, 2008), the reaction against the imposition of Catalan as the sole language, for
example in education, has not been as strong as might be expected. The reason, arguably,
is that for a majority of Castilian Spanish speakers accustomed to seeing the greater social
and economic status of Catalan speakers, Catalan-only education represents a vehicle for
social progress.
Hence, it is fair to argue that these laws are impositions. The acceptance of these laws can
be considered an example of what Nye (2011) calls the third face of relational power
whereby "A helps to create and shape B's basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. B is
unlikely to be aware of this or to realize the effect of A's power" (p. 28). In other words, the
regional government would have been effective in shaping Spanish-speaking Catalan
citizens' language preferences by positioning Catalan as an engine for social progress,
thereby avoiding its perception as an imposition.
In sum, the capillary process derived from soft power methods offers pros and cons. The
use of mass media has involved a high level of manipulation in order to create a virtual
nation, ignoring the existence of a pluralistic Catalan society with a diversity of origins and
thoughts. However, simultaneously, the Catalonia brand (and, very particularly, the
Barcelona brand) would not have been possible without the good governance required for
the quality branding of places.
5. DISCUSSION
The comparison between the historical account and empirical polls provides insight into
the effectiveness of the Catalan government’s strategic management of communication for
purposes of nation-building.
140
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In 1984, the first year when this type of survey started to be periodically implemented, 67
percent of the Catalan population felt only Spanish or as Spanish as Catalan: 22 percent
identified themselves as Spanish only or more Spanish than Catalan, and 45 percent felt
equally Spanish and Catalan (CIS, 2015). In 2017, only 49.3 percent felt only Spanish or as
Spanish as Catalan, while the other 50 percent felt more Catalan than Spanish (22.6
percent) or only Catalan (23.3 percent) (CEO, 2017).
Table 1. Evolution of Catalan National Subjective Identity

Only Spanish
More Spanish
than Catalan
As Spanish as
Catalan
More Catalan
than Spanish
Only Catalan
Don’t know /
No answer
TOTAL

1984

1988

1992

1995

2003

2006

2010

2012

2017

11
11

12
10

13
11

11.2
5.6

9.8
6.7

6.6
5.4

9.9
6.7

5.8
5

7.6
5

45

35

36

41.2

43.2

40.6

43.9

37.6

36.7

22

28

21

24.7

24.7

27.8

22.5

24.8

22.6

8
3

14
1

17
2

15.8
1.4

13.9
1.8

17.5
2.1

14.5
2.5

24.4
2.3

23.3
4.8

100

100

100
100
100
100
Sources: CIS and CEO (2017).

100

100

100

Likewise, as Table 2 illustrates, although a majority of Catalans still want their region to be
a part of Spain, pro-independence sentiment has grown exponentially and seems to have
stabilized, after a decline from its peak in 2013 and despite the end of the economic crisis,
at around 40 percent.
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Table 2. Political status of Catalonia

Independent
Nation State
Federal State
Autonomous
Community
Region
Don’t know /
No answer
TOTAL

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2016

12.9

17.3

21.6

28.2

48.5

41.6

35.8
37.6

33.8
37.8

29.9
36.9

30.3
30.4

21.3
18.6

20.9
26.5

5.6
8.1

5.1
6

5.9
5.1

5.7
5.4

5.4
6.2

4.0
5.6

100
100
Source: CEO.

100

100

100

100

The connection between the surveys on the national subjective identity of Catalans and
political status evolution is undeniable. More Catalan identity means more desire for selfgovernment, if not a directly pro-independence sentiment. Therefore, it can be argued that
the strategic communication efforts by the Catalan government have been effective in
strengthening a Catalan identity that pushes for political change.
Still, we do not know to what extent this merit should be attributed to variables such as
education policies or even mere demographics if, as Vann (1999) and Antón Merino (2015)
suggest, the relative exposure to Catalan or Spanish is the major explanatory variable of
political ideology.
For example, 80 percent of pro-independence Catalans consider Catalan their main
language while about 75 percent of Catalans against independence consider Castilian their
primary language (CEO, 2017). Likewise, Catalans who chose Spanish Castilian as their
mother language have a dual identity, they feel as Spanish as Catalan (55 percent), while
Catalans whose mother language is Catalan have a much higher exclusively Catalan
sentiment (CIS, 2012) (see Table 3). Those Catalans who consider Catalan their mother
tongue tend, on average, to be in favor of more autonomy or independence for Catalonia
(see Table 4). It would seem that the strategic communication efforts, while having some
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impact on Castilian-speaking Catalans, have had more impact on the primarily Catalanspeaking population.
Table 3. Pre-electoral CIS: National subjective identity and mother language
Castilian
Only Spanish
11
More Spanish than Catalan
9
As Spanish as Catalan
55
More Catalan than Spanish
18
Only Catalan
7
TOTAL
100
Source: CIS.

Catalan

Both

0
0
16
34
50
100

1
1
46
31
21
100

Table 4. Pre-electoral CIS: Preferences in the political organization and mother language
Castilian
A Centralized State
15
A State in which
5
autonomous communities
have less autonomy
As the current State
24
A State in which
30
Autonomous Communities
have more autonomy
A State in which
22
independence is possible
Source: CIS.

Catalan

Both

3
1

1
3

5
21

14
30

62

40

If we take into account the fact that Castilian Spanish is the first language for 55 percent of
Catalans (Idescat, 2008), the language variable seems to pose an obstacle for strategic
communication in nation-building. This circumstance is particularly relevant taking into
consideration that Catalonia has traditionally been a place of immigration. More than 18
percent of current Catalans were born elsewhere in Spain (Idescat, 2007). In 1970 alone,
840,000 Andalusians emigrated to Catalonia, mostly Barcelona and its suburbs (Marín,
2010). At least until demographics change, the language variable seems at least as
important, if not more, than strategic communication efforts.
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6. CONCLUSION
Nowadays, a number of communication disciplines seem to minimize the importance of
persuasion in part because of allegations of manipulation (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, van
Ruler, Vercic & Sriramesh, 2007). Nevertheless, persuasion “is the essence of strategic
communication” (p. 24). The Catalan nation-building process is a demonstration of the
power of both persuasion and propaganda. It demonstrates that the influence of a media
apparatus and the implementation of public media campaigns are effective methods for
creating “a national conscience” – or at least a sentiment of identity – among the
citizenship in scenarios where the legal nation's means of communication, in this case
Spain's, tend to overlap with the regional ones. In the Catalan case, the advantage of the
Catalan public media comes not only from its obvious local character but also its
superiority in terms of human and material resources in comparison to the national public
media outlets of Spain.
The Catalan experience also acknowledges how government policies can be considered an
integral part of the whole communication process (Taylor & Kent, 2006). The governments
of regions with a high degree of autonomy, such as Catalonia, often have the capacity to
enact policies that counteract the laws of the legal nation. We find an example of this
regarding the use of languages in the public sphere. For example, Spain’s Constitution
establishes the right of Spaniards to use Spanish in any circumstance in national territory, a
fact that is de facto denied by the primacy given to Catalan since the enactment of local
linguistic laws. Catalan nationalist politicians know no Spanish government is going to
enforce the legality because, in a country where the memory of Franco is still alive, that
would be perceived as an attack on the Catalan language by not just many Catalans, but
also many other Spaniards and a portion of the international public aware of the Catalan
issue thanks to public diplomacy efforts.
A main criticism of this heavy use of persuasion and propaganda is that it has generated
alienation from the political process among a certain segment of the population,
particularly the lowest social strata, since Catalan nationalism can be understood as a top144
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led project (Miley, 2007; García, 2010). This fact has been evident in most elections where
popular participation barely reaches 60 percent, and particularly in the last referendum to
approve the new Second Statue of Autonomy in 2006, where barely 50 percent voted. In a
highly pluralistic region where we find people born in Catalonia, people whose parents
came from other parts of Spain and people who were born in other parts of Spain or the
world, Catalan nationalism projects a very homogeneous idea of Catalan identity. Strategic
management of communication in nation-building processes where identities and
languages overlap should abandon maximalist objectives, and be redefined as building
collective and inclusive identities that can be shared by most members of a society.
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